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Executive summary 
Publicly funded skills training programmes have generated poor employment and 
productivity outcomes across developing countries because the governance of skills 
programmes is not straightforward. Value for money is best assessed by trainees actually 
getting jobs or getting jobs with better pay. But this is a difficult target, and different types 
of fraud, collusion and corruption can be used to misreport outcomes and to hide the 
problem that policy needs to address.  
Training providers in the public sector in Bangladesh have suffered from severe governance 
problems. Apart from straightforward leakages of funds, there has been widespread political 
interference in the selection of trainers and trainees, as well as inefficiencies in the 
management and delivery of training. This paper focuses on private training providers (PTPs) 
which have emerged as the most significant segment of the market in Bangladesh. As the 
role of PTPs has increased across developing countries, a common strategy to align their 
incentives with good training outcomes has been to pay the training provider staggered fees 
for each trainee at the point of enrolment, graduation and finally employment. In theory, 
this should create incentives for the trainer to provide employment-generating training, but 
it can also create incentives to misreport employment and engage in other types of collusion 
and corruption when submitting invoices.  
We examine the causes and possible solutions to this problem, as it affects a critically 
important activity for sustaining inclusive growth and improving wages and conditions for 
the poor. To access this sensitive information, we developed research relationships with two 
important skills programmes in Bangladesh. The first was a partnership with Palladium 
International, an international development company, who run the Sudokkho skills 
programme in Bangladesh and the second with UCEP, a well-known non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) providing skills training.  
The partnership with Palladium International allowed us to exploit a unique opportunity to 
access sensitive data from private providers in the Sudokkho programme engaged in training 
entry-level workers for the Bangladesh garments industry. The analysis of invoices from 
these providers over a six-month period and random checking of trainees who were 
reported to be in employment showed significant variations in the extent of misreporting 
across otherwise similar training providers. This evidence enabled us to investigate plausible 
causes of differences in the ‘propensity to misreport’.  
We found that a significant part of the problem emanates from the demand side of the skills 
market. This is often ignored when designing incentive and governance schemes for training 
providers because it is assumed there is effective demand for skilled workers when firms 
report skills shortages (as is often the case in countries such as Bangladesh). In reality, 
regardless of their own perceptions, firms differ in their capacity to use skilled workers as a 
result of differences in their organisational capabilities – that is, the routines and processes 
within the firm that ensure rapid throughput, low rejection rates, the maintenance of 
quality, low input wastage, efficient order management, and so on.  
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Low-capability firms with poor internal organisation have production lines that move so 
slowly that better trained workers may make no appreciable impact on firm productivity or 
profitability. In contrast, high-capability firms will not only seek to employ skilled workers, 
they will immediately identify unskilled workers because they slow down their production 
lines. The non-linear relationship between skills and productivity is at the heart of the 
problem that drives both fraud and corruption by skills providers as well as the low success 
rates of skills programmes globally.  
Trainers supplying low-capability firms either have to report low employment success (and 
suffer the financial consequences) or engage in fraudulent overreporting to get paid. Both 
the fraud by training providers and the low employment success that they often achieve are 
typically symptoms of a deeper problem that can only be addressed by investing in the 
organisational capabilities of firms. We demonstrate the relationship between organisational 
capabilities on the demand side of the skills market and fraud on the supply side by 
developing an indicator for the organisational capability of firms. The evidence shows that 
the propensity of a PTP to misreport is strongly correlated with the organisational 
capabilities of the factories they supply. Training providers are much more likely to 
misreport when they face low-capability firms on the demand side because the latter prefer 
to employ untrained workers at their factory gates. Training providers who are fortunate 
enough to supply high-capability firms appear to engage in no fraud or very low levels of 
fraud, even in the adverse governance context of Bangladesh.   
Our second partnership with UCEP gave us access to valuable data on the destinations of 
trainees from four UCEP schools training entry-level garments workers. Armed with this 
information we could test the plausibility of the high employment rates reported across all 
UCEP schools against the organisational capabilities of the firms that they were supplying to. 
This test challenged the results reported by some UCEP schools. Further investigation 
suggested that the problem here was not fraud but the way in which employment was being 
measured and reported. The schools supplying low-capability clusters had a much higher 
percentage of employment in informal establishments and as self-employment, as opposed 
to employment in garments factories. Our research indicated that UCEP too could do much 
better if the constraints set by low capability firms on the demand side could be addressed.  
Instead of the usual focus on monitoring and enforcement, our anti-corruption strategy 
combines skills training with investments to improve the organisational capabilities of firms. 
Investments to improve organisational capabilities are known to be feasible in the 
Bangladesh garments industry. If these strategies are joined up with skills training 
programmes, training providers who supply poorly trained workers will be quickly caught 
out as their trainees will slow down the production lines of higher-capability firms; PTPs will 
also find it difficult to misreport employment to high-capability firms that keep proper 
records; and most PTPs will have little incentive to misreport if proper training is quickly 
rewarded with jobs for trainees. Implementing agencies that incentivise training providers to 
generate jobs will be much less likely to engage in corruption to cover up overreporting as 
their PTPs are unlikely to systemically engage in fraud, firms will be able to profit from 
better-trained workers and by moving up the value chain they will be able to create more 
and better-paid jobs. Our research connects the dots across a number of different 
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observations to suggest an innovative, feasible and developmental anti-fraud strategy – an 
example of what we have described as ‘aligning incentives’, where redesigning policy 
incentives can create self-enforcing incentives for rule-following developmental behaviour in 
a sector (Khan, et al. 2019). 
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1. Introduction 
Developing countries need to create many millions of jobs in globally competitive industries 
to achieve and sustain inclusive growth. However, between 40% to 50% of employers in Asia 
and Africa believe that their productivity and profitability are held back by the poor 
education and skills of their workers (Almeida, et al. 2012: 11). Huge sums have been 
pumped into skills programmes, but cross-country evidence shows that skills programmes 
have almost uniformly delivered disappointing results.  
In the ten years from 2002 to 2012 the World Bank invested nearly US$9 billion in 93 skills 
programmes across the world. However, evaluations show that few achieved any positive 
training effects (particularly for men) and even fewer could be justified on a cost-benefit 
basis (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 8-9). Another review of evaluations across countries 
concluded that these programmes generally did not have a significant effect on wages (a 
measure of increased productivity) though there was some impact on employment 
(Betcherman, et al. 2004: 53).  
Indeed, a World Bank (2015) evaluation of five skills programmes in India training six million 
people over 2011-2015 at a cost of US$500 million found that only 28% of trainees were in 
jobs after a year. The treatment effect, which indicates how many of these people had a job 
that they would not otherwise have had, was even smaller because many of these trainees 
would have found work anyway. Comparing trained with untrained cohorts, the study 
estimated a very unimpressive 7% of trainees to be in jobs that they may not otherwise have 
found. In estimates across countries, the same study estimated that the treatment effect of 
skills training ranges from 0% to 12% (ibid.). A World Bank (2007) tracer study in Bangladesh 
found that two years after graduation, only around 12% of trainees from public- and private-
sector technical and vocational education and training (TVET) organisations had found 
employment. And, again, the treatment effect would be even lower.  
These disappointing effects contradict the widespread perception of employers that skills 
shortages are holding them back. If the problem was simply a skills shortage, graduates of 
skills programmes should have achieved much greater success in finding jobs, particularly in 
countries like Bangladesh with big manufacturing sectors. Instead, skills programmes in 
developing countries usually result in an outmigration of skilled people to other countries 
when they are unable to find local jobs. All of this evidence tells us that we need to 
understand the skills problem better.  
This paper focuses on the garments industry in Bangladesh and draws on research 
relationships with two important skills programmes in the country to test the hypothesis 
that improving the organisational capabilities of firms in tandem with skills training is an 
effective and feasible anti-corruption strategy in developing countries such as Bangladesh. 
The first partnership is with Palladium International, an international development company 
that runs the Sudokkho skills programme. The second is with the Underprivileged Children’s 
Educational Program (UCEP), a well-known non-governmental organisation (NGO) and 
training provider in Bangladesh with a high employment success rate.  
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In section 2 we consider challenges in the governance of the skills sector in Bangladesh and 
the impact of fraud and corruption on the part of training providers and possibly 
implementing agencies, before describing in section 3 particular skills programmes and 
providers operating in the garments industry there. Importantly, in section 4, we consider 
the role of organisational capabilities in driving fraud in the skills sector and set out our 
hypothesis about an effective and feasible anti-corruption strategy. We analyse training and 
employment data provided by our research partners in section 5 to explore the ‘propensity 
to misreport’ among private training providers (PTPs) and develop an indicator to 
demonstrate the relationship between organisational capabilities on the demand side of the 
skills market and fraud on the supply side. Finally, in section 6, we discuss the policy 
implications of our analysis and evidence.  
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2. Governance of skills training in 
Bangladesh and the cost of corruption 
The garments industry in Bangladesh is the most developed manufacturing sector in the 
country, employing around three million workers. But the labour market has a high turnover 
of workers, and employers regularly report skills and worker shortages.  
As in other developing countries, surveys in Bangladesh have always identified significant 
skills gaps (ADB 2015; Rahman, et al. 2012; World Bank 2007; ADB 2014a; ILO 2012; GOB 
2011, 2015). Around 500,000 students enrol in technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET) programmes in Bangladesh every year, but the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB, 2014b) estimates that this is only around 20% of the country’s annual training needs. 
Around 95% of TVET institutes are now in the private sector covering around 75% of TVET 
students. But TVET trainees are only 2.8% of the number enrolled in secondary education 
and an even lower percentage of those in jobs. Labour force surveys show that for every 
employee with a TVET qualification, there are 104 with secondary school or higher 
secondary certificates, and 34 with university degrees (World Bank 2010). The very low 
share of TVET graduates in employment could reflect poor training quality, but it could also 
reflect low demand on the part of businesses, for reasons that need to be understood.  
The provision of high-quality skills training in Bangladesh is constrained by numerous problems 
that many developing countries face (ADB 2015; Rahman, et al. 2012; World Bank 2007; ADB 
2014a; ILO 2012; GOB 2011, 2015). First, there is a shortage of trained teachers due to the 
poor output of teacher-training colleges and institutes. Secondly, particularly in public TVET 
institutes, there are poor internal incentives to reward training quality. Thirdly, bureaucratic 
delays in getting financial sanctions, together with political lobbying, often block decisions on 
appointments. There is typically a 50% vacancy rate for teaching positions in public training 
institutes, and teaching positions are often filled by less qualified but politically connected 
individuals. Fourthly, there are pedagogic shortcomings in both public and private training 
institutes, with an overemphasis on theoretical rather than practical skills. Fifth, funding is 
often inadequate to maintain facilities, replace old equipment, or purchase adequate 
consumables and training materials. Finally, links with business are often inadequate.  
Government rules provide limited flexibility to public training institutes to respond to market 
opportunities, to hire their own trainers or enter into partnerships with the private sector to 
provide training tailored to their needs. Private-sector and NGO TVET institutes are 
supposed to respond to market incentives, but they too get different types of subsidies from 
government and development partners. Their responsiveness too may be affected by the 
incentives created by these rents, and they may feel it is best to go along with current 
development partner narratives to ensure their flows of funds. But, most importantly, even 
with the best links with business, training providers have no way of adequately addressing 
the problem of low capabilities of firms on the demand side. All these problems cannot be 
immediately addressed, and some of them simply reflect resource constraints in a poor 
country.  
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The most useful response is to identify feasible policy levers that are most likely to have a 
positive effect, taking structural features of the context like the general poverty level as 
given. The question should be: how can policy be feasibly redesigned to improve skills 
training outcomes?  
The first step is to ask if resources are being properly used or if inappropriate policy design is 
contributing to a misuse of resources. If it is possible to improve resource use without 
massive increases in funding and without expecting significant qualitative improvements in 
the overall governance environment in the country, then these improvements may be 
deemed to be feasible. They may then set off virtuous cycles if they allow the economy to 
grow faster and generate more tax resources for further investments in the system. 
However, feasible policy changes are not necessarily easy.  
As a general observation, rent-seeking and governance problems arise whenever policy 
resources are allocated to solve a social problem. Policies that allocate public resources to 
address such problems create policy rents – that is, revenues that particular individuals or 
organisations get to deliver goods or services that may not otherwise have been provided. 
Individuals and organisations that have a chance of accessing these resources can be 
expected to try and engage in ‘rent-seeking’ to get these resources on terms favourable to 
them, and their interests may not always be aligned with the delivery of the policy goals. The 
outcomes of these rent-seeking activities depend on how the policy intends to allocate 
resources, to whom, and on what conditions; and on the interests and bargaining power of 
the individuals and organisations involved in delivering policy outcomes and of those 
governing the process.  
Addressing skills shortages requires the allocation of policy rents because the skills market is 
subject to well-known market failures. In the absence of any policy, employers are likely to 
hold back from investing in training because their trainees may leave, taking their skills to 
other firms. Workers in turn may hold back from investing in skills if they are unsure of the 
requirements of employers, the quality of the training they are paying for, or the additional 
wages they may achieve. The result is likely to be an underinvestment in skills on both sides. 
Some degree of public coordination and financing of skills training is therefore often required. 
In Bangladesh, all the public TVET institutes, and around 1,600 of the 3,000 accredited private 
ones, receive monthly payment orders from the government that cover 100% of their basic 
teacher salaries (ADB 2015). Many of the remaining private TVET organisations receive 
programme funding from development partners under various programmes.  
But policy has to be well-designed to ensure that these resources are not diverted or 
wasted, for instance as a result of engaging low-quality trainers, providing training not 
aligned with market demand, selecting trainees who are not seeking jobs, and so on. 
Unfortunately, any public policy, including skills policy, is likely to be subject to rent-seeking 
attempts and in developing countries some of this rent-seeking is likely to take the form of 
fraud, corruption or collusion of different types. The most serious problem with these types 
of corruption in the policy sphere is that they tend to hide the source of the problem and 
make it even more difficult to identify feasible solutions (Almeida, et al. 2012; Khan 2000).  
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There are broadly three ways in which public funds for skills training can be delivered, each 
with specific governance and rent-capture problems. The first is to provide financial support 
or tax breaks directly to the firms investing in the training. In theory this reduces (but does 
not eliminate) the loss to the firm if trainees subsequently leave the firm, and this should 
increase their willingness to invest in training. In theory, training that is paid for by the firm 
will also be directly aligned to their needs. But this policy can fail if firms choose to use the 
money for purposes other than training, and if the policy governance is weak so that firms 
can prevent external monitors to withdraw funds from them, either because they are too 
powerful or because they have the right connections, or because they can offer bribes. 
Moreover, low-capability firms may not be the best judge of the types of training they need, 
and governance agencies would have to assess if the firm’s assessment of its skills 
requirements was appropriate. As these governance problems can be severe in developing 
countries, this strategy is rarely observed in these contexts.  
A second alternative is to provide training subsidies directly to workers so they can seek out 
and buy their own training. A voucher system for training has been recommended by some 
development partners in Bangladesh (ADB 2014b: 8). Here there are likely to be different 
monitoring and enforcement conditions, and a different set of problems of fraud and 
corruption. Governance agencies have to ensure that subsidies for training are not used for 
any other purpose. Even if the subsidy is provided as a voucher, in the governance 
conditions of Bangladesh, the government has to be able to monitor that there is no 
collusion between voucher recipients and fraudulent skills providers to cash in vouchers and 
share the subsidy with ‘trainees’ without providing effective training. In addition, there are 
likely to be significant asymmetric information problems because workers may have 
inadequate knowledge of the types of skills that are most marketable. More seriously, 
workers may not be able to assess the relative quality of different training providers. Such a 
system would therefore only work if the state could accurately advise jobseekers of 
potential opportunities and credibly certify training institutes, neither of which are plausible 
in the structural conditions of most developing countries. This arrangement too is therefore 
not widely observed.  
This brings us to the third alternative, which has a number of variants, and is the one that is 
most widely adopted. This is to provide public or development partner money to public and 
private training institutes and provide them with different types of incentives and support to 
provide high-quality training. Here a different set of corruption and collusion problems can 
emerge and, once again, appropriate incentives and governance structures are required to 
ensure that resources are not diverted or wasted. Training providers may appoint politically 
connected or bribe-paying trainers who do not have the proper qualifications for the job. 
They may enrol fake trainees or trainees who are not interested in seeking jobs, but who 
may be using their placement to collect stipends or diplomas that they can claim is higher 
education. Finally, training providers may also have poor internal incentives for maintaining 
quality and aligning with market demand even when the professional quality of their trainers 
is adequate.  
Here, the governance requirement is that external auditors should be able to check these 
failures and withdraw funding from training providers who are persistent violators. We know 
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that external monitoring and enforcement is generally weak in developing countries, and 
that is why policy has tried to align the interests of training providers with good training 
outcomes. By linking part of their payment to training outcomes, the aim is to reduce the 
costs of external monitoring. This is more likely to be effective for private training providers 
and has been widely adopted by government, development partners and their implementing 
agencies in Bangladesh. As a result, most skills programmes in Bangladesh pay private PTPs 
in a staggered way, paying a part of the cost of each trainee at the point of enrolment, a part 
at graduation, and a final part if the trainee achieves employment within a defined period. 
Linking payments to specified employment outcomes should create incentives for trainers to 
provide training of the appropriate quality and type. Unfortunately, as we shall see, these 
schemes also create incentives to misreport these numbers, in particular of employment. 
Nevertheless, compared to the other two alternatives, public policy support for training 
institutes is relatively more likely to deliver acceptable training results in developing 
countries, and that is why this method of delivering training is most commonly observed.  
The difference between fraud and corruption is that they refer to rule violations by different 
types of organizations. When private sector PTPs misreport their employment success, this is 
accurately described as fraud. However, if the implementing agency decides not to act on 
this information, their misuse of power is corruption. The implementing agencies, even if 
they are private sector, play a quasi-public role as governance agencies for the programmes 
they implement. Any self-interested misuse of this power is therefore corruption. The 
implementing agency may choose to cover up fraud by PTPs under their watch for a number 
of reasons. The most common one, of which we have some evidence in the case of some 
implementing agencies, is that any reported fraud by their PTPs may slow down the flow of 
funds on which they depend. In our case Palladium-Sudokkho was involved in our research, 
clearly not interested in covering up, making the research possible. In general, fraud by PTPs 
and corruption by implementing agencies or government authorities are likely to coexist. 
Our aim was not to detect instances of fraud, but to understand the sources of the problem 
so that feasible solutions may be found. In any case, even for implementing agencies that 
are not interested in covering up, random checking and enforcement are ineffective 
solutions if the underlying business model does not work for key players.  
The efficacy of such incentive schemes depends on the training provider’s assessment of the 
relative attractiveness of providing high-quality training compared to the cost and risk of 
organising fraud and corruption. The feasibility of providing high-quality training as a 
business strategy depends on the cost of training relative to the payment offered for the 
training. Even if the direct cost-benefit calculation is favourable, the feasibility of an honest 
strategy depends on the likelihood that the workers trained by the provider will actually find 
jobs even if the training is adequate. In other words, it depends on the characteristics of the 
demand-side of the job market, a fact that is often ignored in discussions of incentive 
schemes.  
This strange omission is partly explained in countries like Bangladesh by the widespread 
perception that there is strong market demand for skilled workers in sectors like garments 
and textiles. When asked in surveys, employers repeatedly identify skills shortages as 
constraints to their business expansion. Employers may genuinely believe this and yet be 
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wrong. We find that in the same industry, low-capability employers behave very differently 
from high-capability ones even when they are supplied with trainees from training providers 
passing identical quality checks by the same implementing agency. Contrary to expectation, 
low-capability firms do not search out skilled workers to raise their productivity. Rather the 
reverse. The effective demand for skilled workers coming from lower-capability companies is 
too low to sustain incentives for training providers who supply to them. These training 
providers may soon find that a strategy of providing high-quality training without fraud is 
unsustainable for them, even if a non-fraudulent business strategy may have been feasible if 
the demand was there. These training providers may then engage in varying levels of fraud, 
depending on how difficult it is to find jobs for their trainees. Over time, their involvement in 
fraud is obviously likely to also affect the quality of their training. A PTP engaging in fraud 
will not be able to motivate its trainers to provide high-quality training for very long, and 
new trainers may begin to be selected more for their willingness to operate in a context of 
fraud rather than for their training skills.  
In the longer run, this two-way relationship between placement success and training quality 
means that the lower employment success of some training providers may result in their 
training quality dropping. Subsequent observations may then appear to suggest that the 
cause of poor employment success of these providers is their poor training quality. Clearly, 
both directions of causality are plausible. The direction of causality from poor training 
quality to low employability is so obvious that it does not really require testing. It is, 
however, important to test the opposite direction of causality from low organisational 
capabilities of firms to low effective demand for skilled workers to fraud by training 
providers.  
This direction of causality is important to test, because if true, focusing primarily on the 
quality of trainers will not suffice as training quality is likely to deteriorate if the business 
model is unsustainable without further policy intervention. We test this hypothesis by 
looking at the behaviour of a sample of newly selected training providers with similar initial 
training qualities. If these providers demonstrate differences in their level of fraud that 
correlates with the organisational capabilities of firms they supply, we have evidence of an 
important driver of fraud in the skills market that needs to be addressed.  
We can now attempt a back-of-the-envelope calculation to suggest the scale of the problem. 
We limit ourselves to a best-case scenario where the training providers are considered to be 
of high quality in the context of the country and their quality and training methods have 
been checked by a credible implementing agency. The variation in the level of misreporting 
across otherwise similar training providers in Sudokkho, which we report in greater detail 
later, ranged from 0% for some PTPs to 60% of invoices or more in others. The average 
invoice misreporting across these PTPs was 18.4%. These ranges were picked up by random 
checking by a high-quality implementing agency, Palladium International, operating with a 
small number of PTPs selected as being of relatively high quality in the Bangladesh context. 
This scale of misreporting is therefore the lower bound of the misreporting that is likely to 
be found across the board in Bangladesh.  
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In the context of a budget of well over US$1 billion that Bangladesh is spending on skills 
training in the next four to five years, the most conservative estimate of direct resource loss 
due to invoice fraud just of this type would be in the region of US$200 million. But the true 
cost of this type of fraud, and any corruption it might then trigger on the part of 
implementing agencies monitoring the invoices, would be many times greater. That cost 
would include the lost opportunity of creating millions of jobs because of a badly designed 
skills programme whose weaknesses are hidden by the operation of this type of corruption.  
In the section that follows we describe three particular skills programmes in Bangladesh, 
including the two organisations with which we collaborated during this research.  
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3. Skills providers in the garments 
industry 
3.1. The Skills for Employment and Investment Programme 
(SEIP) 
The largest skills programme in Bangladesh is the Skills for Employment Investment 
Programme (SEIP), funded by loans from the ADB, grants from bilateral partners and 
contributions from government and industry. From 2014 to 2021 the programme had a 
budget of US$1,070 million, with a target to train 1.5 million workers, around half of them in 
the garments and textiles sectors.  
Participating ministries and sector associations act as implementing agencies and contract 
public and private training providers. Sector associations include the Bangladesh Garments 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), which contracts training providers and 
manages payments to them against targets for training and placement in employment.1 
Unfortunately we could not persuade SEIP to give us access to their sensitive internal data. 
But, in fact, this turned out to be an advantage because the diversity of providers within a 
large programme like SEIP is so great that it is difficult to plausibly adjust for all the known 
factors affecting training quality without access to an implausibly large number of providers. 
Our work with smaller programmes where the training providers had been selected in ways 
that reduced the effects of other confounding factors was therefore crucial for testing the 
impact of a single critical factor that may affect training outcomes.  
An officially sanctioned evaluation of the SEIP programme in 2019 found 68% of trainees 
were in employment a year after completing training (Ahmed 2019). This figure is much 
higher than comparable global assessments referred to earlier. However, employment is not 
clearly defined in this study and it is very likely that it includes self-employment as the study 
also says that 74.3% of the employed were ‘regular’ employees. This suggests that excluding 
the self-employed, the figure for regular employment may be closer to 50%. But even this 
figure is out of line with global, regional and country evaluations of skills training outcomes, 
so either the SEIP programme was performing much better than programmes anywhere else 
in the world or, more likely, the estimate reflects flaws in the evaluation method.  
The evaluation was based on phoning a small sample of trainees, and the response rate 
within the sample was only 30%.  The evaluation implicitly assumes that the 70% who did 
not answer were similar to the 30% who did. In fact, the likelihood is that genuine trainees 
who had found jobs were more likely to answer questions about their employment status 
 
 
1
 http://seip-fd.gov.bd/about-us/background/ accessed 15 September 2019. 
Better jobs: A strategy to end fraud in skills training in Bangladesh 
16 
when anonymously called. This is because trainees who attend SEIP programmes get paid a 
monthly stipend, and this can create a reluctance to be negative about their training 
experience. In the context of the widespread patronage networks in Bangladesh, at least 
some trainees have to pull strings to successfully enrol in a free training programme with a 
stipend. Our informal conversations with trainees and training providers confirmed this 
expectation. All of these factors make it unlikely that the trainees who did not respond were 
just the same as the trainees who did, and we therefore do not have great confidence in the 
numbers generated by the study.  
As SEIP is the largest skills programme in Bangladesh, we talked extensively with several 
managers running SEIP programmes for the BGMEA, which is one of the implementing 
agencies for SEIP. In this role, the BGMEA appoints training providers and monitors and pays 
them under the SEIP programme. Several BGMEA implementation managers freely admitted, 
off the record, that their training providers frequently over-stated employment to meet their 
targets. The implementation managers did not think this type of overreporting was 
unjustified and were happy to release payments without a stringent protocol for checking 
the accuracy of the invoices. In justification they pointed out that the continuation of the 
programme required meeting ambitious targets. Instead, they blamed BGMEA’s firms for 
dragging their feet in employing trainees while complaining about skills shortages. 
Interestingly, these programme managers were ostensibly working for the BGMEA’s firms. 
While the programme managers were willing to admit that their training providers did some 
overreporting, they were not willing to share invoices with us to allow us to measure the 
extent of overreporting and the characteristics of training providers that engaged in higher 
levels of overreporting.  
3.2. Sudokkho 
Sudokkho, the training programme run by our research partner Palladium International, is a 
much smaller programme. Funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) and the Swiss Development Agency (SDC), its budget over 2015 to 2020 was just over 
£20 million. The programme aims to train around 100,000 people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds for the garments and construction sectors. Sudokkho’s philosophy is to develop 
a zero-subsidy model to ensure that employers and trainees share the cost to make training a 
self-sustaining activity in Bangladesh.2 Of course, this would only work if the market failures 
in skills training were not very serious. Otherwise, as explained earlier, policy resources 
would be required to support skills training. Apart from market failures, the programme 
faced the additional challenge that there were large competing programmes like SEIP that 
were not only free but also paid stipends to trainees.  
  
 
 
2
 https://sudokkho.org accessed 15 September 2019. 
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From our perspective, Sudokko’s fee-based model was very fortunate as a mechanism of 
trainee selection. It ensured that trainees on the Sudokkho programme were more likely to 
be genuine jobseekers and not ‘trainees’ who enrolled to pick up a stipend while looking for, 
or being already engaged in, other jobs or activities. The fact that they had paid a nominal 
fee for the training further increased the probability that they were genuine jobseekers. This 
significantly reduced the impact of a confounding factor: the inclusion of dilettante trainees 
in training numbers who are not really interested in finding a job but are there for other 
reasons, such as to pick up a stipend. In addition, Sudokkho PTPs knew that their 
employment success would be measured in terms of jobs as sewing machine operators in 
the garments industry, so they had no incentive to recruit anyone for training who was 
unlikely to take such a job. Restricting our comparison of employment success across PTPs to 
a cohort of trainees who were very likely to be actual jobseekers in the garments industry 
removed the need to adjust for differences in the ratios of genuine jobseekers across PTPs 
when assessing their training outcomes.  
Secondly, Sudokkho’s selection process for contracting PTPs in the programme was also very 
useful for our study. Sudokkho enrolled PTPs through a careful process of vetting based on 
an examination of the qualifications of their trainers and their approach to training. It then 
invested in developing training capabilities and ensuring that the right machinery was 
available to the PTP to provide entry-level sewing machine operator training. The relatively 
small number of PTPs in the programme was useful for ensuring that this vetting and quality 
upgrading process was credible. There were 12 PTPs engaged in their garments sector 
training through our study period. While this number is small, the purposive selection and 
upgrading of training capabilities and machinery ensured that the training capabilities of 
Sudokkho PTPs were comparable. This too reduced the impact of another critically important 
confounding factor that could affect differences in employment outcomes, namely 
differences in the quality of training on the supply side. With a larger sample of PTPs of 
greater diversity, the data would have to be detailed enough to adjust for differences in PTP 
training quality. 
Finally, all Sudokkho PTPs worked with the same incentive scheme, and they all came under 
a common governance structure. Sudokkho subsidies equated to a maximum of 60% of the 
total training costs, based on three instalments; 20% at enrolment, 50% on graduation and 
the final 30% on submitting evidence of employment. The management of the invoices, their 
checking and the subsequent random checking during the period of our study were all done 
by the same implementing agency. This too eliminated the effect of an important 
confounding factor that affects employment outcomes across PTPs in Bangladesh. 
Differences in incentive structures, the percentages paid for various milestones, the 
credibility of the invoice checking and differences in the likely severity of the actions that the 
implementing agency may take are all likely to affect the effort that the training provider 
puts into training, and therefore the quality of the training. Our sample did not face this 
problem as the incentive structure and governance mechanisms were identical across these 
PTPs. By being able to exclude a number of critically important variables that are known to 
affect the employability of trainees, our comparison of differences in fraud and employment 
outcomes across a relatively small number of PTPs has much greater validity than the 
number of PTPs in our sample may suggest.  
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The most important result of our partnership with Palladium was that we were able to access 
sensitive invoice data from Sudokkho PTPs, including random checking data that allowed us 
to identify which PTPs were engaged in invoice overreporting and the extent of their 
overreporting. Discussions around our hypothesis began with Palladium in 2016 and at 
around the same time Sudokkho began to randomly check invoices submitted by their PTPs 
for accuracy. The checking took the form of randomly calling trainees reported to be in 
employment and asking them various questions, including whether they had graduated, 
whether they were in employment, and where. Sudokkho made this checking data and the 
invoice data available to us from December 2017 to December 2018 for 40 or so PTPs, of 
which 12 focused on garments.  
In early 2018 Sudokkho’s random checks began to detect overreporting of employment and 
other anomalies in the invoices of some of their PTPs. What was particularly important was 
that the invoices also gave detailed information on the factories or establishments where 
trainees from the PTPs were being employed. Sudokkho tracked a number of red flags, 
including trainees not confirming employment when phoned, reporting self-employment, 
reporting incomplete training when full training was reported, and being employed in jobs 
that were not in the garments industry. Some red flags were detected directly from the 
invoices, in particular if the same mobile number was reported for multiple trainees. We 
excluded red flags that could be attributable to clerical errors because these were queried by 
Sudokkho and cleared on response. We estimated the propensity to misreport of each PTP 
as the percentage of red flags in their randomly sampled invoices in the first six months of 
invoice checking. We restricted our estimates to the sampling that happened in the first six 
months of invoice-checking because significant collusion between PTPs and trainees 
emerged after that. The percentage of ‘red flags’ identified by random invoice-checking does 
not necessarily tell us the true percentage of fraud or attempted fraud: that could be higher 
or lower in individual PTPs. However, the distribution of red flags tells us something about 
the propensities to misreport and therefore the propensity to commit fraud across these 
PTPs. Nor were we interested in the follow-up of the red flags. We were primarily interested 
in the distribution of the propensity to misreport across PTPs, which varied from 0% to 30% 
(but was much higher in two which resulted in contracts being cancelled). 
An immediately interesting finding that aligned with our expectation was that invoice-
checking on its own was unsustainable as a source of data for enforcing compliance, even in 
an implementing agency that was not interested in covering up this data. The political 
settlements framework suggests that organisations like PTPs are relatively powerful in the 
context of the skills business. These organisations can be expected to informally respond to 
attempts to enforce rules that are against their interests. Their responses distort or 
undermine attempts to make them follow rules given the weakness of the external 
enforcement of a rule of law, and likelihood of informal collusion emerging (Khan 2019b). 
The responses of powerful players are unreasonable and extractive in some cases. But at 
other times, their responses may be ‘reasonable’, in the sense that following the rules may 
not be feasible without other adjustments. In these cases, anti-corruption can only make 
progress by addressing the problems that make rule-following behaviour infeasible for many 
actors in the sector.  
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When an invoice was red flagged by Sudokkho, an investigation was initiated, payment 
withheld, and further justification requested from PTPs. On discovering the initial cases of 
fraud, Sudokkho introduced a tighter monitoring schedule and applied a zero-tolerance 
policy where documented fraudulent behaviour led to the cancellation of contracts and 
reported to both donors and government. Training providers were not allowed to continue 
their partnership with Sudokkho following a verified and documented case of fraud. 
However, after six months or so of picking up variations in invoice misreporting across the 
PTPs, Sudokkho discovered that the violating PTPs were beginning to ‘fix the system’. 
Random checking began to generate responses that tallied much more closely with what had 
been reported in the invoices. This was not because all PTPs had suddenly become 
compliant. Deeper investigations by Sudokkho revealed that trainees had been briefed that 
calls may come and had been asked (or incentivised) to respond appropriately.  
Nevertheless, the early random checking data for the six months from December 2017 to 
May 2018, before the PTPs had time to respond, are a goldmine because the ‘propensity to 
misreport’ shows a significant variation across otherwise fairly similar PTPs. In section 4 we 
set out our hypothesis about the importance of the organisational capabilities of firms on 
the demand side – if this hypothesis is supported in this controlled case, it is also likely to 
hold for the more diverse population of training providers. A comparison across a larger 
number of training providers would have to be large enough to plausibly control for the 
three confounding factors discussed earlier, and sensitive invoice data would have to be 
available for such a large sample. The data requirements would therefore probably not be 
viable given that such a study would require access to sensitive data across a large number of 
different implementing agencies. As is described later in section 5, our study shows a 
statistically significant negative correlation between invoice misreporting by PTPs and the 
organisational capabilities of the firms they supply to. Although the correlation is based on a 
relatively small number of PTP observations, it shows the impact of one variable on the 
propensity to fraud in a comparison where important confounding factors were controlled 
by selection.  
3.3. The Underprivileged Children’s Educational Program 
(UCEP) 
The third skills programme that we looked at is one of the most successful skills providers in 
Bangladesh.3 UCEP is an NGO that began life in 1972 with a focus on primary education for a 
target population of the most underprivileged children in Bangladesh. Over time it has 
shifted its emphasis to provide vocational and technical training to broader cohorts of the 
poor. It serves around 55,000 children and young people in 53 general schools, 10 technical 
schools and in other programmes.  
 
 
3
 http://www.ucepbd.org/ucep/ accessed 12 November 2019. 
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More than 95% of UCEP’s job-seeking graduates are reported to be in employment within six 
months (ADB 2015: 20). However, unlike Sudokkho, the employment recorded by UCEP does 
not have to be in the sector for which training was provided and can include self-
employment. The percentage in employment also excludes individuals who continue in 
different types of education after their skills training. This makes it difficult to assess the 
training-related employment effect achieved by UCEP because formal unemployment is 
always going to be low in a poor country like Bangladesh. Even so, UCEP’s reported success 
is higher than the equivalent employment figures reported by SEIP, even ignoring the 
methodological questions about the latter’s estimates.  
The relative success of UCEP is widely recognised by international development partners. 
UCEP’s training programmes are recognised for their use of appropriate machines and 
realistic production lines in their training, and for providing practical training that meets 
industry requirements. The organisation also has a reputation for placement success based 
on their contacts with high-capability employers.  
UCEP is governed by a voluntary group known as the UCEP Association, which elects a seven-
member Board of Governors for a two-year term. The Board typically includes 
representatives of successful businesses in Bangladesh who give their time as part of their 
corporate social responsibility. They appoint the Executive Director and the management 
team, they advise the Executive Director, and they establish contacts with the broader 
business community (UCEP 2015). These business mentors also provide machinery to UCEP 
of the type used in their firms to train students on production lines. This close relationship 
with high-capability businesses is one reason why UCEP trainees are both better trained (in 
the sense of practical relevance) and better connected to the types of employers who may 
employ them. 
Apart from competent management and a knowledgeable board, the success of UCEP 
relates to its internal incentives. As an NGO it has been dependent on international donors 
for 99% of its financing until very recently. Maintaining its reputation for high employment 
success has therefore been critically important. This has created compelling internal 
incentives for high-quality outcomes (ADB 2015: 55). The challenge for UCEP is to maintain 
its success with lower external funding as Bangladesh becomes a middle-income country and 
grants from development partners begin to decline. Identifying a sustainable governance 
and business model for skills sector investments is therefore also important for UCEP. It too 
needs to understand the constraints in the skills market, and it enthusiastically partnered 
with our research, providing access to its monitoring and evaluation data for four of its 
schools servicing the garments industry.  
As UCEP is both the implementing agency and the training provider in its schools, it does not 
randomly check invoices. Instead the organisation has a strong placement programme and 
reports between 95% and 99% employment success as defined earlier (UCEP 2015). Our 
interest in the UCEP data was to use placement evidence from this high-quality training 
provider to check whether their reported employment figures are consistent with our 
estimates of the organisational capabilities of the firms they supply.  
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We used information provided by UCEP on the destination of their entry-level trainees for 
the garments industry over the same period as Sudokkho to check whether the high 
employment recorded by all UCEP schools was consistent with what we had observed in 
Sudokkho. The high employment results reported by UCEP were indeed plausible for their 
flagship Gazipur school which supplied to high-capability garments firms. But the figures 
appeared to be less plausible (to varying degrees) for the three other schools, which supplied 
to lower capability firms. The resolution to the puzzle came when we looked at the detailed 
breakdown of types of employment reported. Some UCEP schools recorded much higher 
levels of self-employment or employment in low-wage informal establishments. This 
secondary test confirmed the usefulness of the relationship we identified between the skills 
training success in higher-wage formal sector factories and the organisational capabilities of 
these firms on the demand side. These findings are potentially very useful. In the absence of 
significant external funding, a viable business model of the type we identify would also 
enable UCEP to put its strong training capabilities to the best possible use in the future.  
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4.  Organisational capabilities and 
productivity 
A feasible strategy to address fraud and corruption in skills programmes requires a working 
hypothesis of the determinants of productivity and competitiveness in firms. In theory, the 
productivity of a worker depends on their skills and education, the type and quality of the 
machinery the worker operates, and other firm and country-specific variables. Some of these 
variables may affect productivity together with skills in additively separable ways, but others 
can interact with skills to determine productivity in more complex ways. These interactive 
relationships are potentially of great importance for understanding the anomalous outcomes 
of investments in skills, and why these can trigger some types of corruption.  
Global comparisons show huge differences in productivity across firms producing the same 
products with the same machinery and with comparable human capital. These differences 
have to be attributed to firm-specific and country-specific differences, including differences 
in organisational capabilities – that is, the routines and processes within a firm that ensure 
rapid throughput, low rejection rates, the maintenance of quality, low input wastage, 
efficient order management, and so on. Clark and Wolcott  (2012) show that in 1978, output 
per worker-hour in cotton spinning in the United States was 7.4 times higher than in India 
using the same machinery. What could possibly explain productivity differentials of this 
magnitude? Even if US workers had higher levels of education and skills, this cannot 
plausibly explain productivity differentials of 600% to 700% when using the same simple 
machinery. Clark and Wolcott explain this by saying that Indian workers engage in much 
greater ‘free riding’ because of their cultural attitudes. We do not find this argument 
convincing, particularly because the authors themselves point out that Indian workers 
migrating to advanced countries soon behave like native workers (Khan 2019a).  
A more plausible explanation is that US factories are better organised. Organisational failures 
can significantly lower the output of a factory per day or hour by slowing down production 
lines or as a result of frequent stoppages beyond the control of individual workers. These 
differences in factory output will be arithmetically captured as differences in output per 
worker-hour with similar machines, regardless of the skills of individual workers or how hard 
they are working, or indeed their cultural differences. If the throughput of production is faster, 
if stoppages due to missing raw materials or product rejections are less frequent, if machine 
breakages are fixed more rapidly because organised systems are in place, if appropriate spare 
parts are present in the store and so on, one factory could produce much more output per 
worker-hour than another with similar machines and with workers of similar skills.  
Productivity differentials are no less significant across firms producing identical goods within 
the same country. In India, the ratio of the productivity of firms in the 90th and 10th 
percentiles producing identical goods in the formal sector is 5.0, and in China 4.9 (Hsieh and 
Klenow 2009). In advanced countries like the US the difference is lower, but the ratio is still 
at least 2 (Foster, et al. 2008). The huge differences in manufacturing productivity between 
advanced and developing countries in producing identical products with identical machinery 
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can block the development of manufacturing production. Differences in productivity 
translate into differences in the unit costs of producing products of identical quality. If wages 
are low enough, they may compensate for the productivity differential, or the firm can 
specialise in lower quality products that have a different and lower profit market. Moreover, 
the huge differences in productivity within developing countries can block the spread of 
manufacturing activities and thereby block inclusive growth if follower firms cannot replicate 
the success of leader firms. In India, spinning emerged as a competitive industry despite the 
huge productivity differentials observed by Clark and Wolcott (2012) because Indian wage 
differentials with the US were even larger. Developing countries that failed to develop 
competitive spinning industries had productivity gaps that were so large that even their 
large wage differentials could not compensate.  
These productivity differentials cannot be explained without reference to organisational 
differences between firms. The significant differences in productivity across otherwise 
similar firms partly relate to management skills (Bloom, et al. 2013). However organisational 
capabilities refer not just to the quality of management but to a wide range of routines 
describing the collective practices of the firm (Khan 2019a). Establishing effective routines 
goes beyond what is meant by good management, though management may play an 
important role in organising the collective learning-by-doing through which a firm’s 
organisational capabilities improve. The difference between the analysis of Bloom et al. 
(2013) and our focus on organisational capabilities (Khan 2019a) is about whether 
management practices describe or can correct the full range of organisational differences 
that we describe as organisational capabilities. Bloom et al.’s intervention to improve 
management practices in a sample of Indian textile firms improved productivity by 17% over 
a year, which is clearly small relative to the differences described above. In any case, the 
presence of firm-specific organisational capabilities or management practices mean that skill 
improvements can no longer be expected to have an additively separable or linear effect on 
productivity. The effects of improvements in skills on productivity may range from zero to 
very positive depending on firm capabilities, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Skills, organisational capabilities and productivity 
 
Source: the authors 
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In firms with low organisational capabilities, an improvement in the skills of specific workers 
from S1 to S2 may have no noticeable effects on the value added by these workers. This is 
because in these firms, production lines move slowly and there is frequent down time 
because of bad order flow, missing inventory and spare parts, product rejection, and so on. 
Skilled workers standing idle do not add value. Moreover, if the technology is relatively 
simple as in garments, unskilled workers may perform just as well on slow-moving 
production lines after a few days of on-the-job training. Employing skilled workers may 
appear to produce little additional effect for the firm. In contrast, for a firm with high 
organisational capability, production lines are moving rapidly, and the ability of a worker to 
perform quickly and precisely is at a premium. Here, an improvement in skills from S1 to S2 
for lagging workers may have a big impact on the value added by these workers.  
Another way of interpreting Figure 1 is to say that the value added by a worker depends not 
just on the individual skills of the workers, nor even just the skills of other workers, but also 
on the coordinated behaviour of all the other individuals in the organisation. The 
organisational capability of a firm therefore describes its collective capability of cooperation 
and coordination as an organisation. This capability is typically embedded in the firm’s 
organisational routines (Dosi 1988; Nelson and Winter 1982; Perez and Soete 1988). 
Routines describe how different departments and individuals coordinate when new orders 
are contracted and how their timing is aligned with orders being completed, how inventories 
of spare parts and raw materials are maintained and managed, how product quality is 
checked, how defects are identified and corrected, how wastages of raw materials and other 
inputs are minimised, how machinery breakdowns are fixed, how production lines are 
rebalanced against orders, and so on. These are not just questions of skills, but of systems 
that can use skills effectively. The organisational capability of a firm or organisation is a 
measure of the relative effectiveness of its organisational systems and routines compared to 
its competitors.  
Unlike skills that are embodied in individuals, organisational capabilities refer to the collective 
knowledge embedded in the operational routines of an organisation. This knowledge is not 
about how to operate particular machines or carry out processes like accounting. Rather it is 
the tacit knowledge of how to interact within the organisation given its technologies of 
production and its formal governance structures to maximise output, profitability and 
competitiveness. This tacit knowledge cannot just be possessed by managers and supervisors 
but must be collectively practiced in routinised organisational behaviour. Everyone in an 
effective organisation does not have to have the same organisational knowledge, but all 
members of an effective organisation need to know their part of the organisational routines 
that enable the organisation to operate optimally (Khan 2019a).  
Organisational capabilities are therefore not the same thing as the quality of management or 
supervision or even management practices. Putting a good manager into a badly organised 
factory may make no difference unless the manager is given the time and implementing 
power to recast many different organisational routines. This is usually beyond the capacity 
or remit of most managers and requires instead collective learning-by-doing and adaptation 
of routines by an organisation as a whole. Similarly, in a well-working organisation, 
particularly one that is engaged in the production of relatively simple products like 
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garments, the departure of particular managers or supervisors usually does not create any 
huge disruption because the major organisational routines are already in place.  
The relative organisational capability of a firm can then be measured in a number of ways. 
Ideally, we would want to compare the target firm with another producing the same product 
with similar machinery and technologies, a workforce with similar skill levels, and similarities 
in other observable factors that may affect outcomes. Observed differences in the value 
added per worker can then give us a measure of the degree of organisational advantage or 
disadvantage that the target firm has relative to another, or relative to the average of similar 
firms. However, data on value added per worker are often quite hard to get. For instance, 
garments industries in Bangladesh do not even disclose their employment data and the 
employer’s associations, the BGMEA and the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BKMEA) do not hold even approximate employment data at the firm 
level. Fortunately, organisational capabilities can be proxied in other ways. In the next 
section we describe how we were able to indirectly measure relative organisational 
capabilities using a number of different indicators.  
Without adjusting for the non-linear effects of organisational capabilities, the effects of skills 
training may appear to be indeterminate or random across the universe of firms. But if we 
distinguish firms in terms of their organisational capabilities, a pattern does emerge, but one 
that is the reverse of what we would expect: firms that are most in need of skilling up 
appear to be most resistant to employing skilled workers. When these employers discover 
that hiring skilled workers makes no difference to the speed of their production lines or their 
profitability, they tend to blame it on poor training and revert to employing cheaper 
unskilled workers at the factory gate. Of course, some trainers do a bad job of training, and 
the training is not aligned with the needs of the employer, making it even more difficult for 
the employer to identify the true causes behind their persistently low productivity. We 
exclude these and other factors that affect training quality by comparing outcomes across 
training providers whose quality was externally validated and supported by the same 
credible implementing agency. Any variation that still remains has to be explained by other 
factors like the demand-side capabilities of firms. For these firms in Figure 1, the gain in 
productivity when skills of some workers increase from S1 to S2 may be too low to justify 
paying them even a slightly higher wage, let alone justifying any employer contribution to 
training costs.  
In contrast, high-capability firms may be willing to pay a wage premium for workers with 
greater skills and, in some cases, provided other contracting failures are not very serious, 
they may even be willing to pay some of the costs of training. In fact, the quality of skills may 
be so critical for the highest capability firms that they may invest in their own skills training 
rather than rely on external trainers whose quality they may find hard to assess.  
In our interviews with Bangladeshi garments firms, we observed just such an inverse U-
shaped demand for skills across firms of different capabilities when we asked them about 
their willingness to employ trained workers. This was part of our informal scoping before 
commencing the research. We observed a strong relationship between how well a factory 
appeared to be organised in its internal production systems and their willingness to employ 
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trainees from external training providers. The relationship that emerged through 
conversations with employers and trainers, and which we could theoretically explain using 
differences in organisational capabilities, is summarised as the paradox of skills demand in 
Figure 2.  
Figure 2. The paradox of skills demand 
 
Source: the authors 
The upward sloping part of Figure 2 constitutes the paradox because the demand for skills 
should theoretically be highest in firms that have low capabilities and low productivity. Firms 
that appeared to be poorly organised, like subcontracting firms that relied on other factories 
to give them order spillovers, had low skill levels. They should have been the keenest to find 
skilled workers, but they preferred to employ workers at their factory gate. In contrast, 
intermediate-to-high-capability firms with steady export orders and good relationships with 
foreign buyers preferred to employ workers with some exposure to skills training. But the 
highest capability firms supplying to upmarket foreign retailers, which were also some of the 
biggest firms, did their own training because the quality of skills mattered most to them. 
They also had the scale to set aside entire production lines for training. An example is the 
Standard Group, which employs more than 50,000 workers in the garments industry. They 
expressed a preference not to employ workers trained by external training providers 
because their skills requirements are exacting, and they did not want externally trained 
workers to disrupt the flow of their lines. These employers are only likely to go to external 
skills providers if their training quality is assured to be very high. They are, however, a 
relatively small segment of the market in Bangladesh, given the distribution of firm 
capabilities. The relevant policy goal must be to ensure that skills trainers can help the vast 
majority of firms that are in the low-to-high range of organisational capabilities.  
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4.1. The hypothesis: improving organisational capabilities 
to end fraud and corruption in the skills sector 
Our empirical analysis of fraud explores how this paradox of the skills market may be 
affecting the propensity to misreport in the skills training sector. The hypothesis we want to 
test is that PTPs that happen to supply to clusters of low-capability firms face low effective 
demand for their trainees. Everything else being the same (and we adjust for this by working 
with PTPs that are similar in terms of their trainee selection, training capabilities and 
incentive structures), PTPs supplying to low-capability firms are more likely to engage in 
fraud than PTPs supplying to more capable firms. Our hypothesis relies on the upward 
sloping part of Figure 2. Very high capability firms are not in the market for externally 
trained workers as they do their training themselves, but none of our PTPs supplied any 
significant numbers to these types of firms.  
Of course, all firms do some in-house training. Statistical analysis using the World Bank’s 
Investment Climate Survey data in Bangladesh shows that in-house training takes place 
across the industrial sector and is broadly effective in raising productivity and wages (World 
Bank 2007: 20 and Appendix 4). Nevertheless, our qualitative assessment suggests that with 
the exception of the highest capability firms, in-house training facilities are limited to 
learning-by-doing on working production lines. For most firms there is effective demand for 
externally trained workers, particularly in mid-to-high-capability firms. This is the upward-
sloping part of the inverse U-shape in Figure 2.  
If our hypothesis is correct, effective demand for skills can be increased and fraud reduced 
by working with firms to raise their organisational capabilities towards the level where the 
effective demand for skilled workers is highest in Figure 2. This is the level of capabilities 
where we would expect to see fraud disappearing when training providers supply to such 
firms. Improving effective demand for skills beyond that level would require significant 
improvements in the quality of training, because the highest-capability firms have more 
demanding requirements for skills than can be supplied by the average PTP. But this is 
possibly not the immediate policy priority as the highest capability firms can do their own 
training. This qualitative understanding provides the basis for our hypothesis, which we test 
against the available evidence in the next section. 
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5. Evidence and analysis  
As described earlier, the selection of Sudokkho PTPs allowed us to control for at least three 
sets of factors that could result in differences in training outcomes and therefore the 
propensity to engage in fraud across providers. Thus, though our sample was limited by the 
actual number of PTPs that Sudokkho worked with, by being able to remove the effect of 
three known critical variables, our result is more robust than it would have been with a 
somewhat larger but unconstrained sample. A larger sample would have to be large enough 
to control for known factors affecting training outcomes and this would be infeasible simply 
because sensitive data on fraud would be impossible to access across such a large number of 
training providers and implementing agencies. A strong and significant negative correlation 
between the propensity to misreport and the average organisational capabilities of firms on 
the demand side in our sample provides the most robust support for our hypothesis that 
could be feasibly achieved given the sensitive nature of this data.  
To test our hypothesis, we needed data on two variables. The first is the PTPs’ propensity to 
misreport in invoices and the second is the organisational capability of the firms that each 
PTP supplies. The first variable, the ‘Propensity to Misreport’ by training provider p, PMp, 
was constructed from the data collected across Sudokkho PTPs through the random invoice 
checking conducted by Sudokkho during the first six months of our study period. The figure 
for each PTP is the percentage of red-flagged invoices in total invoices, as explained earlier. 
The second variable is the mean ‘Demand-Side Organisational Capability’ of the firms 
supplied by each PTP p during the study period. We define this as DSOCp 
Our initial plan was to construct the DSOC index directly through a survey, but this had to be 
abandoned when we discovered that factories were very suspicious of external research into 
their operations. Our 12 PTPs listed 1,098 trainees and 346 exporting factories and a number 
of other types of establishments in their invoices for the first six months of 2018 when the 
random checking of trainees was most effective. In our pilot survey of the first 150 factories 
we found that we could only gain access to 23 factories, leading us to abandon the survey. 
We were asking potentially sensitive questions, such as how many separate orders the 
factory could simultaneously manage, how many order deadlines they had missed in the last 
year, how many shipments had to be airfreighted as a result, their estimates of product 
rejection rates, and the names of the foreign high street retailers they supplied, to identify 
their product quality. We discovered that it was too optimistic to expect firms to answer 
these types of questions. Indeed, firms were reluctant even to disclose their current 
employee numbers. However, abandoning the survey forced us down an alternative and 
ultimately better path, and we were able to construct a robust proxy indicator based on 
externally verifiable evidence.  
We looked for indices that could give us indirect measures of organisational capabilities of 
firms, and which could be constructed from data that we could potentially acquire. As 
Sudokkho PTPs had to report jobs in the garments industry, their trainees went to three 
types of establishments. Most of the establishments were export-oriented factories. A 
number were not direct exporters, but subcontractors who were not listed as exporters but 
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which indirectly exported by getting the overflow business from exporting factories when 
the latter had more orders than they could supply. These exports would normally take place 
in the name of the mother company. There is no record of the value or type of production of 
subcontracting factories in Bangladesh, but we know that high-quality products are not 
subcontracted to such firms if the contracting firm has to maintain high product quality. 
Finally, some employers were not proper factories at all but variants of tailor shops of 
various sizes that supplied clothing to the local market.  
We used three indices that each capture different aspects of the organisational capabilities 
of firms. We then combined the three indices using principal components to give us an 
aggregate indicator of organisational capability that maintained the variations within the 
three indices. Our first index is the unit value of the exports of a factory at the 4-digit HS 
code, relative to the average unit value of the same items for all factories in Bangladesh. The 
4-digit HS code disaggregates products down to the level of men’s and women’s shirts or 
trousers and so on. The intuition here is that a factory that exports, say, higher-valued men’s 
shirts or women’s trousers than the average garments factory in Bangladesh producing 
these items must have correspondingly better organisational capabilities. Producing higher-
valued versions of the same products is likely to mean that it has better systems of internal 
quality control, better marketing and order management systems integrated with higher-
quality foreign retailers with more demanding timelines, better internal systems to manage 
inventories of more expensive fabrics with stricter quality and colour requirements, better 
systems for minimising wastage and quality rejections of more expensive fabrics, and so on.  
Our data to calculate the indicator on relative unit value of exports came from the National 
Board of Revenue (NBR), which records the dollar values of exports of every export-oriented 
firm in Bangladesh as well as the physical weight of their exports at the 4-digit HS code level. 
This record is based on information in letters of credit and is therefore fairly accurate. We 
needed data not only for our 346 exporting firms, but also for all the thousands of exporting 
garments factories in Bangladesh exporting items with the same HS codes as any of our firms 
in 2018, the period of our study. We were able to access this comprehensive data because 
our research partner, the Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Development, BIGD, 
works with and is trusted by the NBR, and could assure the NBR that commercially sensitive 
information would be anonymised.  
The relative unit value index was calculated as follows: we first calculated 𝑈𝑖ℎ1, the unit 
value of the product with HS code h1 exported by factory i 
𝑈𝑖ℎ1 =
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 ℎ1 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑖 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 ℎ1 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑖
 
We then computed 𝑈𝐴ℎ1, the unit value of the product with HS code h1 exported by all 
factories, A. 
𝑈𝐴ℎ1 =
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝑆 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒 ℎ1 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 ℎ1 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 
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Next, we calculated the relative performance of factory i in producing products with HS code 
h1 by comparing its unit value with the average unit value achieved by all factories 
collectively:  
𝑈𝑖ℎ1
𝑈𝐴ℎ1
. If this ratio is greater than 1, factory i is correspondingly above average in 
its organisational capabilities in producing this product and below average if less than 1. As a 
factory typically exports several products with different HS codes h1, h2, etc, we then 
calculate the weighted sum of the relative unit values of exports of factory i across all 
relevant HS codes, and this is our first index of the organisational capability of factory i, 𝑂𝑖
1: 
𝑂𝑖
1 =  
𝑈𝑖ℎ1
𝑈𝐴ℎ1
∗ 𝑉𝑖ℎ1 +
𝑈𝑖ℎ2
𝑈𝐴ℎ2
∗ 𝑉𝑖ℎ2 + ⋯ +
𝑈𝑖ℎ𝑛
𝑈𝐴ℎ𝑛
∗ 𝑉𝑖ℎ𝑛
𝑉𝑖ℎ1 + 𝑉𝑖ℎ2 + ⋯ + 𝑉𝑖ℎ𝑛
 
where  𝑉𝑖ℎ𝑚 is the dollar value of exports of the product with HS code hm booked by factory i.   
Our second index of organisational capability for factory i, 𝑂𝑖
2, looks at a different dimension 
of organisational capability, the capability of a firm to comply with building and safety rules. 
This is a good proxy for an important dimension of organisational capability because 
compliant firms have to set up internal systems to respond to changing compliance codes in 
different dimensions. There is reasonably good data in Bangladesh on the externally certified 
compliance of garments factories with building safety codes and we decided to use this as 
another proxy for looking at variations between firms. Factories can only be compliant if 
they have the internal organisational procedures to ensure that appropriate improvements 
in building and safety infrastructure are implemented. External inspections of building and 
safety standards of Bangladeshi garments factories began shortly after the Rana Plaza 
tragedy in 2013 in which the collapse of a building that housed a garments factory resulted 
in more than 1,100 deaths. Since then, two external agencies, Alliance and Accord, have 
carried out inspections of garments factories and provided certifications of compliance. We 
used data on the degree of compliance (full, partial or not at all) to construct an index that 
gives every inspected garment factory a score of 2, 1, or 0 respectively.  
Finally, our third index of organisational capabilities, 𝑂𝑖
3, scores each establishment for its 
type. The list of employees from the PTPs included a number of small ‘factories’ that were 
more like tailor shops and these needed to be given a score relative to others. They had 
neither export-based unit value data nor external certification of their building safety 
compliance. We distinguished between three types of establishments in the sector. First, 
there are garments factories whose exports are recorded in NBR records. Then there are 
smaller factories that are likely to be subcontracting factories or factories that exported in 
the name of other factories. They have no records of direct exports but do so through a 
mother company that holds the letter of credit. Finally, there are tailor shop operations that 
may employ several people and produce for the local market or the grey export market 
where exports are not properly recorded in NBR statistics. We score these establishment 
types from 3 to 1 to produce an index that gives all establishments a number. The intuition 
behind this is that export-oriented industries have the highest organisational capabilities 
while tailor shops that employ people as tailors for the local market have the lowest 
organisational capabilities as they operate the simplest type of organisation, with limited 
requirements for effective organisational routines. 
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The final index Oi, representing the organisational capability of firm i, aggregates the 
variations in 𝑂𝑖
1, 𝑂𝑖
2 and 𝑂𝑖
3 using principal component analysis (PCA). This technique 
aggregates variations in our three component indices to construct a composite index of the 
organisational capabilities Oi of each firm that still retains as much information as is possible 
on cross-firm variations in each of the three indices (Abdi and Williams 2010). Our 
aggregation strategy is similar to Greco (2018), who uses PCA to compute a single index of 
women’s capabilities using a set of capabilities indicators relevant to women’s wellbeing. 
The organisational capability of firm i, Oi, is one of the core building blocks of our 
subsequent analysis.   
The final stage is to look at the average organisational capability of all the establishments that 
each PTP sends its trainees to. This gives us the demand-side organisational capabilities that 
each PTP faces. For each PTP, designated by p, this number is the simple sum of the 
organisational capabilities, Oi, of all the establishments that each of their trainees t(p), are 
reported to have gone to, divided by the total number of trainees in the PTP. For each PTP p, 
we compute the demand-side organisational capabilities, 𝐷𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑝, faced by that PTP as follows:  
𝐷𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑝 =  
∑ 𝑂𝑖
𝑡(𝑝)
𝑡
∑ 𝑡(𝑝)
 
where 𝑂𝑖
𝑡(𝑝)
 is the organisational capability of firm i where trainee t of PTP p has found 
employment according to the invoice data. The list of trainees in each PTP p over the period 
is 𝑡(𝑝).  
Table 1. Trainer propensity to misreport and demand-side organisational capabilities 
Anonymised 
PTP number 
Propensity to misreport 
invoices, PMp 
Demand-side 
organisational 
capabilities: DOSCp 
1 0.6000 2.8484 
2 0.2061 3.7757 
3 0.1307 4.1055 
4 0.1250 4.5751 
5 0.0584 4.6815 
6 0.0612 4.6894 
7 0.0278 5.0062 
8 0.2750 5.2621 
9 0.1125 5.6275 
10 0.0833 5.8359 
11 0.0857 6.0964 
12 0.0100 6.1283 
Note: The PCA exercise generated an index for demand-side organisational  
capabilities with several negative values. We normalised these figures by  
adding a constant of 5 to each number. This translation maintains the intervals  
and does not affect our correlation results.  
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Table 1 summarises the statistics for the Sudokkho PTPs. A list of the characteristics of these 
PTPs and of UCEP schools is provided as an Appendix table. Our correlation assumes that 
when PTPs put in fake invoices, they name firms they tried to send their workers to but failed. 
But if a provider misreports both the employment status of workers and the names of 
factories their trainees tried to get jobs in, our method will pick up a high demand-side 
capability index for PTPs engaging in fraud when in fact the factories their trainees actually 
tried to get jobs in may have been much lower. We will see later that there is some evidence 
that some PTPs may be engaging in this double misreporting, not only reporting employment 
when there was none, but also misreporting the factories their trainees approached.  
Figure 3. Trainer propensity to misreport and demand-side firm capabilities 
 
Source: The authors. 
Table 2. Correlation of trainer propensity to misreport and demand-side firm capabilities 
 PMp DOSCp 
PMp 1.000  
DOSCp -0.704*** 
0.010 
1.000 
Source: The authors. 
Ignoring the double misreporting problem, to which we return later, Figure 3 and Table 2 
summarise the correlation between our two variables of interest. We find a significant 
correlation of the right sign. The plausible direction of causality here can only be from 
demand-side organisational capabilities to the propensity to misreport. The reverse causality 
is not theoretically plausible, nor are there obvious missing third variables that could explain 
why our two variables should move simultaneously in this way. The correlation coefficient of 
-0.7 is significant at the 1 percent level. Our selection of PTPs eliminated or significantly 
reduced confounding effects of the most important other factors that could explain 
variations in employment success and therefore invoice fraud. Our result is also in line with 
our qualitative understanding of how fraud happens in training providers based on in-depth 
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conversations with many different training providers, firms and implementing agencies. It is 
also aligned with our theoretical and empirical understanding of how organisational 
capabilities can significantly affect firm productivity and profitability. Taken together, all of 
this evidence makes us confident that our result is a robust one that highlights an important 
structural determinant of the propensity to engage in invoice fraud.  
Looking at the scatter points and line of fit in Figure 3, we see that there are two distinct sets 
of PTPs, one above the line of fit and one below. An investigation into the characteristics of 
these sets revealed an interesting pattern that may relate to the distortion, referred to 
earlier, when the misreporting is not only about employment but also about the firms that 
trainees tried to get jobs in. In Figure 4 we look at the two sets of PTPs separately. The PTPs 
on the higher blue line were almost all located close to industrial clusters and therefore 
knew the names of firms near them. These PTPs had an advantage in that their trainees 
were more likely to get jobs, as we expect, but their misreporting when it occurred also put 
in names of higher-capability firms that further enhanced the apparent demand-side 
capabilities their trainees faced. The PTPs on the lower red line were almost all further away 
from industrial clusters and while their propensity for fraud was higher as a result, when 
they did misreport, they were more likely to put in names of lower-capability nearby 
factories so their demand-side capabilities appear to be lower.  
Figure 4. Misreporting by PTPs and distance from industrial clusters 
 
● PTPs close to industrial clusters  ● PTPs further away from industrial clusters 
Source: The authors.  
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We note this inbuilt bias in the data but also that it did not significantly affect the detection of 
a negative correlation between our two variables even with the bias. If anything, it shows that 
the underlying negative correlation may be even stronger than Table 2 suggests. Table 3 and 
Table 4 show that when the correlation coefficients for the two sets of PTPs are calculated 
separately, they are higher, with higher levels of significance. This is an example of problems 
of dealing with data on fraud and misreporting. The fraud can involve a number of dimensions 
and therefore the data has to be used with care. However, in our case, if the fraud jointly 
reported false employment and false firms, this should weaken the relationship we observe 
between the propensity to misreport and organisational capabilities. Despite this, it is 
reassuring that the unadjusted data still show a strong and significant negative relationship as 
already seen in Figure 3 and Table 2. This too increases our confidence in our result.  
Table 3. Correlation for PTPs close to industrial clusters 
 PMp DOSCp 
PMp 1.000  
DOSCp -0.980*** 
0.0006 
1.000 
Source: The authors. 
Table 4. Correlation for PTPs further from industrial clusters 
 PMp DOSCp 
PMp 1.000  
DOSCp -0.889*** 
0.007 
1.000 
Source: The authors. 
We were also given access to internal invoice data by UCEP, the successful skills training NGO 
referred to earlier. We computed demand-side organisational capabilities for the four UCEP 
schools whose training and placement data suggested a uniformly high 90% plus employment 
success rate. We wanted to test whether this was compatible with our hypothesis about the 
importance of demand-side organisational capabilities of firms. Figure 5 shows the values we 
computed for the mean demand-side organisational capabilities 𝐷𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑝 for cohorts from each 
of the four UCEP schools that were training for the garments industry. We put this into the 
same scatter plot for Sudokkho shown in Figure 3, so Figure 5 simply adds the plots of the four 
additional UCEP schools. We attributed zero overreporting to UCEP schools as UCEP assured 
us that their internal monitoring was rigorous, and schools would not be able to systematically 
misreport their employment success over time. The observations plotted for UCEP therefore 
assume that all employment reported was true. 
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Figure 5. A comparison of Sudokkho PTPs and UCEP schools 
 
● Sudokkho PTPs  ● UCEP schools 
Source: The authors.  
The Sudokkho data shown in Figure 5 shows the relationship between the difficulty of placing 
trainees in jobs and the propensity to fraud. The difficulty of placing trainees in jobs goes up as 
demand-side organisational capabilities decline. By superimposing the UCEP data on the same 
diagram it appears that the high employment success of UCEP schools is fully credible in only 
one school, their flagship school located near the industrial cluster at Gazipur. Here the 
demand-side organisational capability is high enough for there to be zero misreporting of high 
employment. The high employment levels are less credible to varying extents in the three 
other UCEP schools. As we have no indication or evidence of any institutionalised 
overreporting problems at UCEP, we sought an answer in the way in which employment was 
being measured. A closer look at the breakdown of employment across UCEP schools in Table 
5 confirms that this can indeed explain the puzzle. UCEP trainees were primarily employed in 
factories only in school 4, where 92% of placements were in factories. In all three other 
schools, the majority of the employment was in tailor shops or in self-employment. Recalling 
our earlier discussion on the treatment effect of skills training in developing countries where 
most individuals would in any case be compelled to find informal or self-employed jobs, the 
treatment effect in UCEP schools 1 to 3 is therefore likely to be low. 
Table 5. Explaining employment success in UCEP schools 
UCEP school DSOCp Employed in export 
factories 
Employed in 
subcontracting factories 
Tailor shops, self-
employed and 
unemployed 
1 4.553 26% 17% 57% 
2 4.922 12% 23% 65% 
3 5.063 16% 29% 55% 
4 6.120 60% 32% 8% 
Source: The authors. 
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The UCEP data are therefore consistent with the evidence we have from Sudokkho and show 
that skills training on its own cannot generate jobs in factories if factories have low 
organisational capabilities. This finding will be of interest to high-quality skills trainers like 
UCEP because the longer-term problem is not only how to address fraud and corruption, but 
also how to devise strategies and governance structures that can sustain inclusive growth. 
Clearly, a simple (but ineffective) way of removing fraud is to change the governance 
structure of the skills programme so that the placement of trainees in high-value jobs is not 
tracked or rewarded. This solves the problem of fraud and corruption but does not address 
the problem of how to get a skills programme to deliver value for money. The challenge is to 
ensure value for money in a skills programme and ensure that the governance of these 
conditions is not subject to fraud and corruption. 
While our research was going on, Sudokkho analysed the risk of fraudulent behaviour 
connected to their payment schedule and terminated the payment for job placement, as its 
management was too demanding on project resources. Instead, they commissioned impact 
evaluation studies to provide reliable information on employment and income generation. 
To reduce the risk of fraudulent behaviour in reporting enrolment and graduation, it 
contracted consulting companies to verify these numbers. To incentivise PTPs to support 
effective job placement, Sudokkho have introduced a system rewarding PTPs for verified job 
placement and linkages with factories. Thus, Sudokkho kept adjusting its systems to ensure a 
high level of integrity in its programme. These responses are somewhat aligned with what 
we recommend in the next section on policy implications, but we would argue that an 
employment target should be retained for PTPs to ensure value-for-money outcomes. 
Without that, it is likely that the treatment effect of training may descend to the low global 
averages that make skills programmes unsustainable on a cost-benefit calculation. The 
challenge is to make the employment targets feasible by working on the demand side. We 
would argue that governance arrangements for employment targets, including a random-
checking strategy, can be made feasible by joining up skills training with demand-side 
capability development programmes. There is clearly an exciting prospect of carrying this 
thinking forward with development partners and implementing agencies like Sudokkho, 
UCEP and others for further testing on the ground. In the meantime, most skills programmes 
in Bangladesh, including SEIP, continue with the incentive systems that have proved so 
difficult to operate without fraud. 
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6. Policy implications for governance 
and anti-corruption 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that a feasible and effective anti-fraud and 
anti-corruption strategy for the skills sector is possible, but it must include a policy 
component that has so far not been fully recognised. The propensity for fraud on the part of 
training providers is virtually zero in the presence of feasible governance and external 
monitoring by a credible implementing agency provided the placement of trainees in factory 
jobs is feasible. The feasibility of placements depends on the demand-side organisational 
capabilities of firms, which determines whether they in turn are able to profit from better-
trained workers.  
Dropping the condition of setting employment targets for training providers is not a solution 
that we would recommend because the treatment effect of the training is likely to fall 
without implausible levels of ongoing monitoring by implementing agencies. We know that 
the treatment effect of skills programmes across developing countries is already very low. 
The challenge is to improve this low treatment effect by identifying incentive and 
governance structures combined with supportive policies to improve the demand for skills. 
This is essential if we want to support inclusive growth outcomes. To succeed, an effective 
policy combination must create incentives for training providers to achieve high-quality 
employment outcomes, but it must also address relevant types of fraud and corruption. 
Otherwise as we have seen, the governance of the programme is likely to either fail or prove 
to be too expensive. 
Our assessment of the magnitude of the problem suggests that we need to go beyond 
providing supervisory and management support to firms to increase their effective demand 
for skilled workers. Supervisory and management support can make some difference, but 
organisational capabilities have to improve quite significantly to have a substantive effect on 
the propensity for fraud on the part of training providers. In terms of our proxy indicator of 
demand-side organisational capabilities (DSOC), the move from a firm cluster that has a 
score of 4 to one that has a score of 6 implies substantive upgrading of a range of 
organisational routines within firms. Our indicator is only a proxy, and the relevant routines 
are the ones that are essential for raising productivity and product quality, as well as 
reducing wastage and downtime. The necessary investments to improve the organisational 
capabilities of firms cannot feasibly be made by skills programmes directly. However, we 
believe that these investments are commercially feasible and need to be organised in a 
joined-up way by development partners or governments. This may be the most useful 
contribution that development partners and governments can make to cut through the 
governance and fraud problems that have bedevilled the skills sector.  
The commercial feasibility of improving organisational capabilities can be demonstrated 
using evidence from Bangladesh. The dramatic take-off of the garments industry in 
Bangladesh in the late 1970s was not preceded by any change in the governance context at 
the national level, or even by any significant skills programmes for workers. It was entirely 
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driven by the acquisition of critical organisational capabilities in one firm that was rapidly 
replicated through imitation by hundreds of others when the organisational routines were 
understood and carried from firm to firm by managers and supervisors (Khan 2019a). The 
managers and supervisors could do this because they understood what a well-organised but 
low-productivity garments factory looked like. However this organisational picture is no 
longer valid as Bangladesh is moving up the value chain, and the necessary organisational 
upgrading cannot be done by incremental improvements in management skills. It requires 
the import of new organisational models from next tier countries that can then be replicated 
by many firms. Replication of more complex models is more difficult but may be feasible if 
some of the investment in acquiring this organisational knowledge is provided as a public 
good by developmental investment agencies like the CDC Group (the UK’s development 
finance institution) or the International Finance Corporation (IFC).  
A contemporary example from Bangladesh helps to demonstrate the feasibility and impact 
of investments in organisational learning. The German investment corporation (Deutsche 
Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft or DEG) supported and later evaluated a skills and 
organisational upgrading programme of a Bangladeshi garments manufacturer, JMS Holdings 
Ltd (DEG 2016). JMS is one of the larger and higher-capability garments manufacturing 
groups in Bangladesh, with a total employment of around 6,300 workers, around 70% of 
whom are women. Like most Bangladeshi garment manufacturers, the group suffered from 
low labour productivity and competitiveness. Between 2012 and 2014 it engaged in a 
programme that combined investments in skills with a capacity expansion plan and support 
for organisational capability development partially financed by loans from DEG. The 
programme engaged an international textile consulting company, Gherzi, to assist with skills 
training and organisational development. The upgrading included an internal skills training 
programme and an organisational restructuring of production lines. The total investment 
was US$1.5 million, of which $820,000 was invested in skills upgrading.  
The results were ‘tremendously positive’, with productivity going up by 37% and capacity by 
74% in two years. Just as important, the quality and unit value of products improved, and 
input wastage declined by more than 80% just between 2014 and 2015. Profits increased by 
more than $1 million over this period and the loan was repaid over two years. According to 
the consultants from Gherzi, around 30% of the 37% productivity growth was attributable to 
the skills programme, and the other 70% to the ‘optimization of the production layout’ and 
new equipment. However, most of this 70% is actually attributed to the reorganisation of 
the production process because according to the consultants ‘the most important 
productivity lever is the optimization of production layout, followed by the training of 
employees, and lastly the usage of new machines’ (DEG 2016: 7, emphasis ours). The 
contribution of new machinery was therefore less than the 30% attributed to training. This 
implies that the biggest effect, possibly around 50% of the substantial total productivity 
growth, is attributed to better production organisation. What is important is that these 
figures should not be understood as additively separable effects. Without the investment in 
organisational change, even the 30% of the growth in productivity that was attributed to 
skills may not have been realised because we know that the capacity of a firm to use skills 
depends on its organisational capabilities.  
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Clearly, JMS self-selected itself in this programme and was a relatively high-capability firm to 
begin with. The precise strategy that JMS adopted with DEG support is not a blueprint for 
the very heterogeneous Bangladeshi garments industry. Firms in the industry have to be 
seen as being on an escalator, and the policy goal must be to help firms graduate from basic 
organisational capabilities towards intermediate and then advanced capabilities (Khan 
2019a). An organisational capability programme should be tailored to fit the starting point of 
a cluster of firms. Our capabilities indicator provides a quick way of establishing the initial 
organisational capabilities of a cluster, and this can indicate the viable upgrading strategy for 
that cluster of firms and the appropriate levels of skills that they will have effective demand 
for once their own capabilities improve.  
This strategy for raising the organisational capabilities of firm clusters, combined with 
employment targets for training providers supplying to these clusters, and adequate 
governance and oversight by implementing agencies (including occasional random 
checking), constitutes the combination of policy and governance that we believe will result 
in low levels of fraud and corruption in the skills sector and at the same time high levels of 
job creation and inclusion.  
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Appendix: Summary characteristics of 
Sudokkho PTPs and UCEP schools 
Anonymised 
Sudokkho PTP 
no. 
Employment characteristics 
Total trainees Total 
employed 
Total 
unemployed 
Total export 
factory 
Total non-
export factory 
Tailor shop Self-employed 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 17 13 4 2 5 6 0 
3 237 220 17 23 197 0 0 
4 122 102 20 34 45 23 0 
5 36 20 9 8 9 3 7 
6 18 3 15 0 3 0 0 
7 166 26 125 3 23 0 15 
8 56 42 13 30 12 0 1 
9 172 107 30 70 33 4 35 
10 37 17 20 15 2 1 0 
11 163 135 28 119 11 5 0 
12 74 54 20 43 8 3 0 
 
Anonymised 
UCEP schools 
no. 
Employment characteristics 
Total trainees Total 
employed 
Total 
unemployed 
Total export 
factory 
Total non-
export factory 
Tailor shop Self-employed 
1 76 18 18 20 13 14 11 
2 136 118 38 16 31 51 0 
3 110 91 19 18 32 41 0 
4 101 93 8 61 32 0 0 
Note: Trainee numbers reflect those for which we could access invoice or monitoring/evaluation data.  
Source: The authors 
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